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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH
THE STATE OF UTAH,

:

Plaintiff-Respondent
vs.

:

LAWRENCE H. ALLMENDINGER,

:

Case No. 14582

Defendant-Appellant

STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE
This case is an appeal from the Third District Court, in
which the defendant was convicted by plea of guilty to the charge
of unlawful possession of a controlled substance.
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT
After being placed on probation, the appellant was ordered
to show cause as to why his probation should not be revoked.

Appellant

moved to dismiss the Order to Show Cause on the grounds that the Court
lacked jurisdiction to revoke appellant's probation.

The court

denied the motion.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Appellant seeks an order of this Court dismissing the Order
to Show Cause and discharging him from the custody of the Third
District Court.

STATEMENT OF FACTS
On May 2, 1975 appellant entered a plea of not guilty in the
District Court of the Third Judicial District in and for Salt Lake
County, State of Utah, to an information charging him with Unlawful
Distribution for Value of a Controlled Substance (R.2-3).

On

June 2, 1975 appellant entered a plea of guilty to the lesser and
included offense in the information of Unlawful Possession of a Controlled Substance, which under Utah Code Annotated §58-37-8(2)(b)(i)
(as amended 1972), carries a penalty of not more than $299 or imprisonment in the county jail for not more than six months. (R.9)
On June 9, 1975, the Court suspended imposition of sentence
and placed the appellant on probation for one year.

(R.10)

On March 4, 1976, Judge Bryant H. Croft signed an order
requiring the defendant to appear and show cause why his probation
should not be revoked.

(R. 11)

This order came almost nine months

after the order placing appellant on probation.
On March 17, 1976, counsel for appellant filed a motion to
dismiss for lack of jurisdiction (R.29) and on March 30, 1976 the
Court heard arguments on the motion (R.30).

Both sides submitted

memoranda and the Court, by memorandum decision of April 19, 1976,
denied appellant's motion.

It is this decision from which appellant

pursues this appeal.
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ARGUMENT
POINT I
WHERE THERE IS NO STATUTORY AUTHORITY FOR EXTENDING A
PROBATIONARY PERIOD BEYOND THE MAXIMUM LIMITS FOR AN
OFFENSE, THE COURT RETAINS JURISDICTION FOR ONLY THE
PERIOD OF THE MAXIMUM SENTENCE AND CANNOT THEREAFTER
TERMINATE THE PROBATION.
Utah Code Annotated §77-35-17, (1953) authorizes Utah courts
to stay imposition or execution of a criminal sentence but does not
specify the length of time for which a commitment may be stayed and the
person placed on probation.

Other than short stays for specified

purposes, the only stays contemplated are those under that statute,
which provides:
"Upon a plea of guilty or conviction of any crime or offense,
if it appears compatible with the public interest, the court
having jurisdiction may suspend the imposition or the execution
of sentence and may place the defendant on probation for such
period of time as the court shall determine.
The court may subsequently increase or decrease the probation
period, and may revoke or modify any condition of probation.
While on probation, the defendant may be required to pay, in
one or several sums, any fine imposed at the time being placed
on probation; may be required to make restitution or reparation
to the aggrieved party or parties for the actual damages or
losses caused by the offense to which the defendant has
pleaded guilty or for which conviction was had; and may be
required to provide for the support of his wife or others
for whose support he may be legally liable. Where it appears
to the court from the report of the probation agent in charge
of the defendant, or otherwise, that the defendant has
complied with the conditions of such probation, the court
may if it be compatible with the public interest either
upon motion of the district attorney or of its own motion
terminate the sentence or set aside the plea of guilty or
conviction of the defendant, and dismiss the action and
discharge the defendant."

1.

McPhie v. Turner, 10 Utah 2d 237, P.2d 91 (1960).
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The Utah Supreme Court has not ruled directly on the issue
of whether a court may impose probation for a period longer than the
maximum sentence allowed.

There is ample authority from other

jurisdictions, however, in support of Defendant's contention that
where the statute authorizing probation fails to specify the
maximum period of probation to which a person may be subjected, the
maximum period allowed is the maximum sentence of imprisonment which
could have been imposed.

The general rule is stated in 21 Am. Jur.

2d Criminal Law §555:
"Where the suspension of imposition of sentence is
authorized, the court does not lose jurisdiction
of the case and it may, after such suspension pronounce
sentence at any time provided the maximum period for
which sentence could have been imposed or probation
granted has not elapsed.T<
(emphasis added) .
The most recent pronouncement on the issue comes from the
New Mexico Court of Appeals in State v. Lard, 86 N.M. 71, 519 P.2d
307 (1974).

In Lard the defendant attacked the propriety of the

enhanced sentence directed by the lower court.

Under New Mexico

law a sentence may be enhanced according to a specific statute providing
for such due to defendant's prior record.

Defendant contended that

the enhancement provision was improperly applied.

The court decided

against the defendant on this issue but stated in dicta the general
rule that . . .

n

"The total length of a deferred or staspended sentence, or
the time served on parole, cannot exceed the maximum authorized
sentence for the crime invoTved.1 (emphasis added) 519 P. 2d at
The Idaho Supreme Court had considered the identical question
presented there in Ex Parte Medley, 73 Idaho 474, 253 P.2d 794 (1953).
In that case, the court was dealing with a statute
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similar to Utah Code Annotated, §77-35-17.

The Idaho statute

provided:
"Whenever any person shall have been convicted or enter a
plea of guilty in any District Court of this State of Idaho,
of or to any crime against the Laws of the State, except
those of treason or murder, the court may in its discretion,
commute the sentence, confine the defendants in the county
jail, or if the defendant is of proper age in the State
Industrial School, suspend the execution of the judgment, or
withhold judgment on such terms and for such time as it may
prescribe and may put the defendant on probation in charge of
some proper person selected and designated by this court for
that purpose and make such orders related thereto as the court
in its sound discretion deems necessary and expedient."
(emphasis added) Idaho Code §19-2601,
(as amended 1949).
Notwithstanding statutory language allowing the court to order
probation for "such time as it may prescribe11

(identical to Utah's

statute), the Idaho Supreme Court stated at 799:
"The period of probation could have been for the maximum
period for which petitioner might have been imprisoned
or for a lesser, but not for a greater period.
(emphasis added) 253 P.2d at 800.
The Idaho Supreme Court recently reaffirmed Ex Parte Medley
in its holding in State v. Sandoval, 92 Idaho 853, 452 P.2d 350 (1969).
In Sandoval appellant argued that one condition of probation
constituted cruel and unusual punishment.

In dismissing the

Appellant's contention the court noted prior holdings concerning
probation and stated:
"The period of probation may last as long as the maximum
period for which defendant might have been imprisoned."
452 P.2d at 358.
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The Supreme Court of Kansas had also ruled that a judge may
parole persons as he sees fit but he has no power to extend the
conditions of the parole beyond the term of the sentence which
could have been imposed.

The Court held In re Carroll, 91 Kan.

395, 137 P.975 (1914) that where petitioners had been sentenced
to six months in jail (the maximum penalty) and placed on parole
by the sentencing judge for two years, the judge was not authorized
to extend the term of parole beyond a maximum sentence.

In language

oft-quoted since this 1914 decision, the court stated:
"But is there no limit to the period of parole? Can it have
been the purpose of the legislature that a police judge,
having imposed a sentence of imprisonment for ten days,
can issue a parole upon the condition that the paroled person
shall be under surveillance for ten years, or even longer and
subject to be committed at any time for a violation of parole?
It is true the statute provides that the parole shall be
granted upon such conditions as the police judge may see fit
to impose, but the view of the court is that it was not the
legislative intent that the parole period might be
indefinitely extended . . . Although the statute. . . does
not expressly declare a limit, one is doubtless contemplated
and, since provision is made for imprisonment, that should
be regarded as the limit of time for the termination of a
parole and the absolute discharge of the paroled person. It
is argued that a parole is a matter of grace and discretion
but could it be regarded as a gracious act to hold over the
head of a convicted person the unexecuted sentence for a lifetin
with the uncertainty that he might be recommitted to prison
without notice at any time when the police judge chose to
order it?
137 P. at 977.
In a situation similar to the case at: bar, the Oklahoma
Supreme Court ruled in 1925 that a judgment could be suspended only
for the length of time of the maximum sentence.
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In Ex Parte Eaton,

29 0. Cr. 275 233 P. 781 (1925) the Court was dealing with a statute
similar to the Utah statute presently in issue.

The Oklahoma statute

did not specify a period for which a person's sentence could be
suspended in lieu of probation or parole.

The statute stated only

that at any time during "pendency of the judgment11 the stay could be
revoked.

The Court held that the judgment was only pending for

the maximum period for which the person could be sentenced because:
"It was certainly not the

intention of the lawmakers to hold the

sentence over the head of a person paroled so long as he should
live . . . "

233 P. at 782.

Although some states by statute allow periods longer than the
term of possible imprisonment, those states h^ve some maximum stated
and do not tolerate revocation after the maxitnum| e.g. Coleman v. Davis
106 So. 2d 79 (Fla. 1958).

Further, where the judge fails to specify

the period in those jurisdictions, it has been generally held to be for
the maximum period for which the person could be sentenced.
supra; People ex rel.

Coleman,

Berman v. Marsden, 162 N.Y.S. 993 (1957).

For

example, in Commonwealth v. Duff, 192 A. 2d 258 (Pa. 1963), the court
stated:
therefore, when the court suspends the imposition of
sentence without fixing terms of probation, it may, for
proper reasons impose a prison sentence . . . if it does
so within the maximum term which could have been imposeT^
for the offenseT
(emphasis added) 192 A.2d at 261-62.
" . . . [W]e have considered such a suspension as
containing an implied probation for the maximum period
for which defendant could have been sentenced . . . "
(emphasis added) 192 A.2d at 261.
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Similar holdings emerge from California,

In People v. Blakeman

170 Ca. 2d 596,339 P.2d 202 (1959) the District Court of Appeals,
First District, Division 1 held that a revocation occurring eight
months after probation was granted was invalid because it occurred
after the maximum probationary period allowable.

In Blakeman the

defendant could have been sentenced to a maximum of six months.
The Court there stated:
"Here, no period of probation was specified in the order
granting it. Accordingly, the six months maximum period
of punishment (Pen. Code, Section 243) became the period
of probation. In re Herron, 217 Cal. 400, 405, 19 P.2d 4;
In re Goetz, 46 Cal. App. 2d 848, 851, 117 P.2d 47;
People y.Theeley, 159 Cal. App. 2d 578, 581, 324 P.2d 65.
Plaintiff argues that when the court imposed a sentence of one
year (excessive by six months) and immediately suspended it,
the court indicated an intent to give probation for one
year. We are not persuaded, particularly in view of the
established principle that when the probationary period is not
specified it is deemed to be for the maximum possible period
of imprisonment."
339 P.2d at 204.
The Third District Court in and for Salt Lake County,
State of Utah has considered the question three times previously in
Petitions for Writ of Habeas Corpus.

In Juliette Harris v. Dewey Fillip

Case No. 187877, (1969) the petitioner alleged that

the court lost

jurisdiction over her after six months, the maximum sentence she could
have been given for the offense committed.

The case file contains

no findings of fact or conclusions of law, however the record of
actions indicates that the Writ was granted by Judge M.C. Faux on
July 18, 1969.

(See appendix A ) .
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In a second case, Charles Franklin Himes v. Delmar Larson,
Civil No. 188585 (1969), petitioner alleged that the court that
had revoked his probation was without jurisdiction to do so.

Judge

Gordon R. Hall granted the Writ on September 9, 1969, signing conclusioi
of law stating that at the time of revocation of petitioner's
probation, the court lacked jurisdiction over him.

(See appendix B ) .

In the third case, Elizabeth Ann Smith v. Salt Lake City Court,
Civil No. 227320 (1975), the City Court had revoked petitioner's
probation.

Judge Stewart M. Hansen, Sr. granted the Writ and made

conclusions of law stating that the maximum length of probation
could not exceed the maximum period of incarceration allowable for the
offense.

(See appendix C ) .

Judge Bryant H. Croft's memorandum opinion in the instant
matter places him in the minority among Third District judges on this
issue.

Although this writer has nothing but the highest respect

for Judge Croft, his decision overlooks the case law and more pursuasive
arguments on the subject presented in this brief and accepted by his
colleagues.

Judge Croft bases his denial of appellant's decision on

two grounds:*
(1)

That in misdemeanor cases the maximum period of imprisonmen*

is usually so short that a probationary period of the same length
would be useless and therefore judges would give jail sentences where
probation would otherwise be proper; and

2.

See Judge Croft's Memorandum Opinion R. 74-78
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(2)

That the problem in (1) above is accentuated where a

defendant pleads guilty to a lesser offense after having been
charged with a greater offense.
Appellant believes it is extremely difficult for any one
judge to determine just how long a period of probation is necessary
to rehabilitate an offender.

While it would seem likely that a first

offender would need a lesser period than a repeat offender, such is
not necessarily the case.

Appellant agrees that a judge must

be able to have the flexibility to deal with offenders on a
case-by-case basis.

To this extent, §77-35-17 grants the court

the power to increase or decrease the probation period or to revoke
or modify any condition of probation.

Appellant sees this

flexibility as essential to the rehabilitative process, however, such
power must be guided by a maximum limit to the period of probation.
Several states have recognized this and enacted statutes specifically
limiting the probation period, as discussed earlier.

In some states

where no limits are prescribed, courts have placed the statutory
maximum for incarceration as the limit for probation.

(See e. g.

State v. Lard, supra and State v. Sandoval, supra. )
Although it may well be true that some defendants cannot be
rehabilitated within statutory maximums for misdemeanors, isn't it
also true that the statutory maximum for imprisonment may not
be long enough to alter a defendant's course of criminal conduct?
All lawyers dealing with criminal cases are familiar with offenders
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who have been imprisoned for statutory maximums in misdemeanor cases
and then convicted again for other offenses.

We may very well

argue that a six month jail sentence is not enough time to
rehabilitate or punish, but the important thing is that our
legislature has fixed a maximum period of incarceration for both
misdemeanor and felony offenses.
periods is parallel.

The principle involved in probation

Although we may not be sure a statutory

maximum sentence for imprisonment is a long enough limit for probation,
our legislature has classified crimes by placing limits on penalties
for those crimes.

Just as some crimes are more serious than others,

requiring longer maximum sentences, so too this distinction exists
in the concept of rehabilitating persons convicted of those crimes.
Some crimes require greater periods of rehabilitation because of their
seriousness than others.

In his memorandum decision, Judge Croft states

that under Utah law some jail sentences cannot exceed ninety days,
as for a Class C misdemeanor, "and a probationary period of
such short duration hardly serves any useful purpose." However, more
insight into Judge Croft's conclusion may be gained by looking at some
crimes which are Class C misdemeanors.
Under Utah Code Annotated § 76-5-106 (as amended 1973),
harassment is a Class C misdemeanor; under §76-6-106, Criminal
Mischief where damage is below $250 is a Class C misdemeanor; under
76-6-206, Criminal Trespass of a non-dwelling is a Class C misdemeanor.
The point is simply that our legislature has determined that criminal
conduct in those cases is less serious than in others, therefore, the
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penalties are less serious.

Although it may be argued that

three months probation may not be long enough to rehabilitate a person
convicted of Harassment, it may also be argued that three months
in jail may not be long enough to rehabilitate or punish such person
either.

After three months in jail, the offender may repeat his

offense or commit another offense proving that three months was
not long enough.

Could it then be argued that the sentencing judge

should have been able to sentence the offender for a longer period,
despite the legislative recognition of the low level of seriousness
of such offense?

Appellant thinks not and asks this court to conclude

that any court's sentencing power is guided by the legislature and not
open to interpretation by each individual judge, whether that
judge is considering imprisonment or probation.
As to the second reason for Judge Croftfs denial of appellant's
motion to dismiss, appellant feels that the preceding discussion
adequately represents his view on the issue.

Appellant would

additionally point out to the Court that our notions of Due Process
of Law require that a man be punished only for the crime he has been
convicted of.

Judge Croft seems to imply that a defendant should be

punished for having been orginally charged with an offense greater than
he is eventually convicted of.

The implication is that a judge

may be hesitant to give probation in plea-bargained cases if he is
limited by the probation period in the lesser offense rather than
being able to give the defendant the probation period which would
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have been given if he had plead to the greater offense.

Since a

defendant is presumed innocent at all stages of a criminal
proceeding prior to conviction, why should he be punished for an
offense he was never convicted of?

As this Court well knows,

numerous considerations are involved in plea-bargaining, not the least
of which is that prosecutors sometimes overcharge cases hoping to
bring pressure upon a defendant to plead guilty to the crime he is
really guilty of, and which carries a lesser penalty than the
original charge.

In such cases, the legislative determination as to

the seriousness of the lesser offense should control a judge's
power to sentence,both for imprisonment and probation.
In response to the point that judges may not accept plea
bargains if the probationary period is limited to the period
of imprisonment of the lesser offense, appellant would argue that
if the court has that much concern then perhaps it should not accept
the plea to a lesser offense anyway.
Although appellant understands Judge Croft's concern, appellant
believes that the interpretation he suggests would best serve the
legislative intent and the concept of Due Process of Law as discussed
in Point II of this brief.
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POINT II
THE UTAH LEGISLATURE INTENDED THAT THERE BE PROPORTIONATE
LIMITS ON PROBATION POWERS OF UTAH COURTS:
As has been seen, Utah Code Annotated §77-35-17 (1953) gives
the courts power to place a defendant on probation "for such period of
time as the court shall determine11; but it is the position of appellant
that this phraseology was not intended to give courts unlimited jurisdiction over a probationer's liberty.

Appellant alleges that whatever

period of time is involved must be consistent with other law on the
subject.

He, therefore, urges this Court to adopt the more reasonable

interpretation that the legislature intended to allow for a probationary
period consistent with the Utah Criminal Code, and an individual's
right to Due Process of Law under the Constitutions of the United
States and the State of Utah, by limiting a Court's jurisdiction for
probationary periods.
Jurisdiction is a common-law creature expressly embodied
in both the United States and Utah Constitutions.

The authority

of District Courts in Utah flows from the jurisdiction granted them
by the State Constitution^ and legislative enactments in harmony
with such grants of power.

See Rocky Ford Canal Co. v. Cox, Judge,

92 U. 148, 59 P. 2d 935 (1936).
It is clear that the legislature has the power to prescribe
and define the forum in which a civil or criminal matter must be
commenced and therefore to set limitations on the jurisdiction of
3.

Art. VIII Sec. 7, Constitution of Utah
-14-

District Courts.^

In fact, the legislative power to prescribe

penalties for crimes necessarily requires a maximum period of
incarceration for such crimes whether the sentences are determinate
or indeterminate.
Appellant contends that it is a matter of Constitutional
doctrine that the legislature provide jurisdictional limits for
probation or parole just as it provides limits for incarceration.
In fact, the Utah legislature, in adopting a complete revision of
Utah's criminal code which was effective July 1, 1973, adopted a statute
which clearly establishes the intent of the legislature to
jurisdictionally limit periods of probation for criminal offenses.
Utah Code Annotated §76-3-201 (as amended 1973) provides:
11

(1) Within the limits prescribed by this chapter, a court
may sentence a person adjudged guilty of an offense to any
one of the following sentences or combination of such sentences:
(a) to pay a fine; or
(b) to removal from and/or disqualification of public or
private office; or
(c) to probation; or
(d) to imprisonment; or
(e) to death."
(emphasis added)
It would appear that it is the declared policy of the
legislature to prescribe jurisdictional limits for probation; and
further that such limitations appear within that chapter (Chapter 3,
Punishments).

Utah Code Annotated §77-35-17 (1953) appears as

4.

State v. Johnson, 100 U. 316, 114 P.2d 1034 (1941)

5.

Utah Code Annotated §76-3-203-206, (as amended 1973).
-15-

part of the Code of Criminal Procedure which is found in
an entirely different Title (let alone chapter) than §76-3-201,
which is part of Utah's Criminal Code.

Since that Section

was enacted in 1953, it would seem that the 1973 provision
(76-3-201) was intended by the legislature to be controlling on the
question of jurisdictional limitations on a court's power to
determine time periods for probation in criminal cases.

This

argument is even more persuasive when considered from the point of
view that since §77-35-17 allows probation

lf

for such period of time

as the court shall determine11 the legislature, due to the absence
of specific jurisdictional standards, intended that that period
of time be consistent with the limitations imposed by other relevant
statutes and that those limitations are the maximum period of time
to which a defendant may be sentenced to incarceration (now under
Chapter 3 of the Criminal Code).
It seems logical to conclude that the legislature intended
(through 76-3-201) to place limitations on the period of time for
which a defendant may be placed on probation, but since Chapter 3 does
not specifically delineate such limitations, the legislature must
have intended the maximum terms of imprisonment to also be maximum
terms for probation.
Such reasoning would be consistent with the overall policy
of Utah's Criminal Code expressed in Utah Code Annotated §76-1-104
(as amended 1975) :
^ The provisions of this code shall be construed in accordance
with these general purposes: . . . (3) Prescribe penalties
which are proportionate to the seriousness of offenses and whicl
permit recognition or difference in rehabilitation possibilitie
among individual offenders."
-16-

It would seem clear that if the legislature determined for
I
example, that theft of property under $100.00 was only serious
enough to warrant imprisonment for six months, that any period of
probation provided in lieu of imprisonment snould not be any longer.
If a serious felony is committed, it seems logical that the period
of probation should be proportionate to the period of incarceration.
If the legislature determines that aggravated assault requires
a 0-5 year sentence of imprisonment, the seriousness of that offense
also requires a longer period of probation than in a less serious
|f imprisonment,
theft case, if probation is granted in lieu o|j
justice system that
It seems to be a fact of the criminal!
" is in fact to some
probation, so often construed as a "privilege
extent, a penalty. The limitations on one's jprivacy and freedom
of movement and association are such that one is clearly "penalized"
for one's criminal conduct even through not imprisoned, and this
is certainly the way it should be.

This view was supported by

Justice Crockett in Brimhall v. Turner, 28 Utilj 2d 321, 502 P.2d 115
(1972):
"Even though he has been placed on parole, he is deemed
to be actually serving the sentence imposed, and is in a
sense in the extended custody of prison authorities."
502 P.2d at 117.
Although a petitioner's parole status Iwas the subject of that
appeal, the principle certainly can be relateq to the status of probatiot
as well.

A defendant on probation is, in a sdnse, in the extended

custody of the Court.

He is required as a condition of probation
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to follow the instructions of his probation officer.

Among other

things those instructions uniformly include:
(a) Maintaining employment;
(b) Notifying probation officer of change of address;
(c) Getting permission of probation officer to leave the
state or to marry;
(d)

Not associating with known felons.

No one, least of all appellant, can argue that such restrictions
are too severe or unnecessary where one has been convicted of a crime
and is on probation in lieu of total loss of his liberty.

Appellant

simply points out these restrictions to remind the court that
probation is, in and of itself, to some extent a penalty.

Is it

not logical to conclude then, that the stated legislative purpose
of prescribing penalties which are proportionate to the seriousness
of offenses requires the interpretation that maximum terms of
imprisonment were also intended to be maximum terms for probation?
That a defendant has certain rights, as well as responsibilities
while on probation, is a concept that has been established through a
long line of Utah Supreme Court cases.

The landmark case on the

issue was State v. Zolantakis, 70 Utah 296, 25 P. 1044 (1927).

In a

scholarly and frequently quoted opinion, Justice Elias Hansen writing
for the majority said:
"The purpose of the law permitting the suspension of sentence
is clearly reformatory. If those who are to be reformed
cannot implicitly rely upon promises or orders contained
in the suspension of sentence, then we may well expect
the law to fail in its purpose. Reformation can certainly
best be accomplished by fair, consistent, and straighforward
treatment of the person sought to be reformed.ff
259 P. at 1046.
This Court then, announced as early as 1927 that the
legal concept of probation is not to be treated lightly
-18-

in this State.

In fact, this opinion, decided 45 years prior to the

heralded United States Supreme Court case of Morrisey v. Brewer,
408 U.S. 471, 33 L. Ed. 2d 484, 92 S. Ct. 2593 (1972) established
the principle that a probationer was entitled to Due Process of Law
before his probation could be revoked, and tqat such Due Process
required:
n

. . . a hearing upon the question of whether or not he has
complied with the conditions imposed; that such hearing must
be according to some well recognized and established
rules of judicial procedure; that defendant is entitled
to have filed either an affidavit, motion or other written
pleading setting forth the facts relied upon for a
revocation of the suspension of sentence; that the defendant
should be given an opportunity to answer or plead to the
charge made; that a hearing should be had upon the issues
stated; and that the defendant as wel|L as the state be
given the right of cross-examination. *'
259 P. at 1047.
Justice Hansen made crystal clear thi^ Court's attitude
toward those requirements when he concluded tljie point by declaring:
,f

If we are correct in our conclusion that the defendant
has a vested right to his personal liberty during
good behavior when so ordered without I reservation in the
original sentence, any proceeding failing in these
essentials is error."
259 P. at 1047.
Lawyers and judges alike have agreed that the United States
Supreme Court's holding in Morrissey in 1972 \^as a step forward in
the administration of the American concept of Constitutional justice.
But isn't it interesting that the Utah Supreme Court recognized, the
same rights for probationers at a time when most states allowed
probation revocations at the whim and caprice |of the sentencing
judge?
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This high regard for the purpose and fairness of the very
concept of probation has been reiterated in numerous Utah Supreme
Court decisions through the years.

See Thompson v. Harris, Warden,

106 Utah 32, 144 P.2d 761 at 767 (1943); Williams v. Harris, Warden,
106 Utah 387, 149 P.2d 640 at 642 (1944); State v. Fedder, 1 Utah
2d 117, 262 P.2d 753 (1953); Baine v. Beckstead, 10 Ut. 2d 4, 347 P.2d
554 (1959); State v. Eichler, 25 Ut. 2d 421, 483 P.2d 887 (1971);
Brimhall v. Turner, 28 Ut. 2d 321, 502 P.2d 116 (1972).
In the Brimhall case, supra, the Utah Supreme Court expanded
the due process requirements of Zolantakis in reviewing a parole
revocation attacked by virtue of a habeas corpus proceeding.
Writing for the majority, Justice Crockett said:
11

. . . (W)e acknowledge the mere fact that there has been
an accusation of crime should give rise to no presumption
adverse to plaintiff."
502 P.2d at 117.
Although Zolantakis and the cases following implied that a
probationer should be afforded the presumption of innocence when
accused of a new violation of law, Justice Crockett's pronouncement
was the first express declaration of this important principle.

Thus,

^through a long series of cases, this Court has recognized that probatior
have rights as well as responsibilities.

It seems logical to conclude

that the state legislature intended to follow these forward-looking
--"due process concepts by limiting the period of probation to the
maximum period of imprisonment provided for in the statute describing
a crime, whether that statute is found in Utah's Criminal Code, it's
Motor Vehicle Act, or its Controlled Substances Act.
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CONCLUSION
It seems to be such a small and logical step for this
Court to conclude that where there is no spedific legislative
pronouncement as to the length of a probationary period, that justice
and fairness dictate that the maximum period of imprisonment be control!
as the maximum period of probation also.

By drawing such a conclusion,

this Court would be following the wise pronouncement of policy in
probation cases as expounded by Justice Hansen almost 50 years ago
when he said;
"Reformation can certainly best be accomplished by fair,
consistent and straightforward treatment of the person
sought to be reformed."
9 P. at 1046
Would it not be fair to allow a persoii convicted of a crime
I
to know that the maximum limit of his period of probation will be no
longer than that of anyone else convicted of the same crime?

Wouldn't

it remove the bitterness and counterproductive attitude that sometimes
being treated consistently
develops when a person can see that he is not
with others in his same circumstance?

Would lit not be straightforward

for the law to adequately inform a defendant that he will be required
to undergo the severe limitations probation often requires for a
set and established period of time; a period wnosemaximum is dictated
by the legislature and not the sometimes inexapt evaluation of the
judge who sentences him?
Respectfully submitted,

LARKY R./pLLEit
Attorney £or Appellant

-21-

APPENDIX "A"

In the District Court of the Third Judicial District,
in and for
Salt Lake County, State of Utah

JULIETTE HARRIS
ENTERED ORDER
MINUTE

CASE NUMBER

Plaintiff

DEWEY

DATED

Fl L L I S

ENTRY

187877

July 18, 1969

MERRILL

C.

FAUX,

Defendant

The Petition

for W r i t

n o w on r e g u l a r l y
The Plaintiff
represented

Corpus

the Court

for h e a r i n g .

appearing

in p e r s o n

and being

being

O'Connell

as c o u n s e l .

represented

by C l i n t o n

Balmforth

as c o u n s e l .

Whereupon,

is a r g u e d

to t h e C o u r t

by r e s p e c t i v e

submitted.

The Court

now

being

orders

having

fully advised

said

comes

before

by J o h n

The Defendant

of H a b e a s

Writ

said

Writ

c o u n s e l and

c o n s i d e r e d and

in t h e p r e m i s e s

be a n d t h e s a m e

is h e r e b y

granted.

*TATE OF UTAH
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE

By
}S*

* S CLEi

'\ - sX>

DEPUTV

/ s / Hal R u e c k e r t
D e p u ty C l e r k

JUDGE

APPENDIX "B"

DAVID !\". °OWM
Attorn:--'' for Petitioner
263 South CecondEast
Salt Lake City. Utah 84111
Telephone: 350-3785

•) c i . r:

v-t

IN T'.TE DISTRICT COURT OF THE TIfIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT,
IN AND FOR, SALT LAKE COUNTY,! STATE OF UTAH

CHARLES FR/NIKLIN HIMES,
FINDINGS OF FACT AND
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

Petitioner,
-vsDELNIAR LARSON,

Civil No. 188585
Re'.pore Ait,

This matter came on regularly for hearing on the 20th day of August,
1969, at 9:00 A. M. The petitioner was present and was represented by
Counsel Davie -'••!. Bown, Attorney at Law; thi respondent was not present
out was repr-e.-ented by Paul Van Dam, Assistant County Attorney for
Salt Lake County; evidence was taken and argjiments were heard and based
:hereon the Court makes the following:
FINDINGS OF FACT
1. That the allegations contained in paragraphs one through eight of
Petitioner 1 ;; petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus are true as alleged.
That the Utah Supreme Court in Stifce vs. Fair,
P2d

42d

J19^9) held the violation of Sec.

58-lCa-3e, Utah-Code Annotate.!, (1953), to bfe a simple misdemeanor.
r

r

r-n j > o m the abovo R i n d i n g : of F a r t Lhei C o u r t make:; the

Eoliov
CeeiCLUSIONG Of LAW
•tit.:oner1:; restraint is illegal forj the following reasons:
R) The "one year in jaiT'condi :ion for probation exceeds

the ma:dr'.am penalty under law for the crime charged.
(b) The sentencing Court was without jurisdiction to
further extend probation.
Dated this

$^£

day of September, 1969.

BY THE COURT:

_

ATTEST
v. s n ^ A N s

<T

\

(

)

^

I, THE UNDERSIGNED, CLERK OP THE WSTmCT
COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY, UTAH, DO HSRE3Y
CERTIFY THAT THE ANNEXED AND FOREGOING IS A
TRUE AND FULL COPY OF AN ORIGINAL DOCUMENT CM
FILE IN MY OFFICE AS SUCH CLERK.
WITNESS MY HAND ANO SEAL OF SAID COURT

THIS .oXUi3AY OF i ^ i d L L ^ L . - « . 19„Xksw
W. ST6RUNG EVANS, CLERt^ { ^
*,

Q

- t ^ ^ C ^

-- HONORABLE GORDON R HALL
.
D i s t r i c t court Judge

*v*utv Clerk

BY X^\\X(>^,

C

° ^ y ^ t L - , . DEPUIY

APPENDIX "C

FILED IN CLERK'S OFRCG
Salt Ulro County, Utoli

1ACK W. Kl'NKI.' R
Salt Lake Legal IX fender Association
Attorneys for Petitioner
343 South Six'Li ;,,'•;:
Salt Lake City. Utah 84102
Telephone: ^32-5444

JUN *i 1975
V. Slfihnj Ev.m, C'U.k )>(f Ql,t. Court
fS]

Dopufy Clvrl

IN Tin: DISTRICT COURT OF THE TIIIflD JUDICIAL DISTRICT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

ELIZABETH ANNE SMITH,

FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS
OF LAW

Petitioner,
-vsSALT LAKE CITY COURT AND
ROBERT C. GIBSON, JUDGE

Civil No. 227320

Respondents.

The above entitled matter having come on regularly for hearing on the
22nd day of May. l'^5, at 9:00 A.M. the petitioneirr was present and was represented by Counsel lack W. Kunkler. Attorney at L aw; the respondent was not
present but was represented by Donald Sawaya, assistant County Attorney
for Salt Lake Conn ty: evidence was taken and arguments were heard and
based thereon the Court makes the following:
FINDINGS OF FACT
1. That the allegations contained in paragraphs one through five,
and paragraphs seven, sixteen, seventeen, eighteen, nineteen and twenty-five
of Petitioner's petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus are true as alleged.
Therefore, from the above Findings of Factf the Court makes the following:
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1. -Petitioner's restraint is illegal for the Jfol lowing reasonsfa)

A person who pleads guilty or is convicted of a crime may

not be placed on probation for a period of time in tbcccss of the period of
maximum incarccran'on allowable \ov that offense,! and
(b).

U:e petitioner plead guilty to a cijime for which the maximum

incarceration allowable was six months, and hence the maximum period for
which she could be placed on probation was six months, and
(c).

The Salt Lake City Court having placed the petitioner on

probation November 27, 1973 that Court lost all jurisdiction over the petitioner six months later on May 27, 1974, and
(d). The probation the petitioner is presently on in Case No.
57788 is therefore invalid and without force

of law.

HONORABLE STEWART M. HANSON, SR.
ATTEST
VV. STERLING EVANS

~~**~ pepoty Ctork

Mailed a cony of the foregoing to the County Attorney, the City Court
Clerk, Judge Robert C. Gibson, and Misdemeanant Probation on the
dav of |unt\ 1975. .

STATE OF UTAH
3UNTY O - SALT
\, T H * M f ' i ' S . R S i G N S D , CLER^K 6 F T H E D I S T R I C T
r o ^ - r c:~ : A : . T \MJ\ COUNTY; UTAH, DO HEREBV
cE»rr;«>' - • T r » i s .•NNEXED AND FOREGOING IS
A T » ! ~ t ^ C • • o - . L CO^Y O F A N O R I G I N A L D O C U ;
JMgfcT Cr. . . . - ;N M Y O F F I C E AS SUCH C L E R K .
W I T N S A a \LY H A N D A N D 3 E A L O F SAID C O U R T

THIS - £ j
DAY OF
^'^< V \ U
)/& STERLING EVANS, CLERK^

N O

^

H

L

/

